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The All-Volunteer Military:
Calling, Profession, or
Occupation?
Charles C. Moskos Jr.
This article was first published in the 1977 issue of Parameters.

D

iscussion of the future of the armed forces usually involves a concern with
technological developments or global strategy. To most of its membership,
however, the military is understood and experienced as a social organization.
Our purpose here is to apply developmental analysis to the emergent military
from a sociological perspective.
Developmental analysis entails historical reconstruction, trend specification, and most especially, a model of a future state of affairs toward which
actual events are heading.1 It emphasizes the “from here to there” sequence of
present and hypothetical events. Stated in a slightly different way, a developmental construct is a “pure type” placed at some future point, by which we may
ascertain and order the emergent reality of contemporary social phenomena.
Models derived from developmental analysis bridge the empirical world of
today with the social forms of the future. Put plainly, what is the likely shape
of the military in the foreseeable future?
Initially, three models—calling, profession, occupation—will be presented, describing alternative conception of military social organization. These
models are evaluated as to which best fits current empirical indicators. The
basic hypothesis is that the all-volunteer American military is moving toward
an organizational format more and more resembling that of an occupation.
Secondly, there will be a specification of some expected organizational outcomes in the military system resulting form the shift to an occupational model.
Finally, there will be several therapeutic proposals which might channel these
evolutions toward a reemphasis of the military’s proper role in national service.
Dr. Charles C. Moskos, Jr., received his B.A. degree in Sociology from Princeton
University and his master’s and doctoral degrees from UCLA. A leading figure in the sociology of the military, Dr. Moskos is Professor of Sociology at Northwestern University.
He is the author of The American Enlisted Man (1970) and Peace Soldiers (1976) and the
editor of Public Opinion and the Military Establishment (1971). Many of his other works
have appeared in scholarly and professional journals, including Parameters. Dr. Moskos
also presents a course during the electives program at the US Army War College.
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Calling, Profession, Occupation
Terms like calling, profession, or occupation suffer from imprecision,
both in popular and scholarly discussion. Nevertheless, they each contain core
connotations which serve to distinguish them from one another. For present
purposes these distinctions can be described as follows:
•• A calling is legitimated in terms of institutional values, i.e., a purpose transcending individual self-interest in favor of a presumed higher good. A calling
usually enjoys high esteem from the larger community because it is associated
with notions of self-sacrifice and complete dedication to one’s role. Although
a calling does not obtain remuneration comparable to what one might expect
in the economy of the marketplace, this is often compensated for by an array
of social benefits associated with an institutional format. Members of a calling
generally regard themselves as being different or apart from the broader society
and are so regarded by others. When grievances are felt, members of a calling
do not organize themselves into self-interest groups. Rather, if redress is sought,
it takes the form of “one-on-one” recourse to superiors, with its implications of
trust in the paternalism of the institution to take care of its own.
Military service has traditionally had many features close to the calling
model. One thinks of the extended tours abroad; the fixed term of the enlistment; liability for 24-hour service availability; frequent movement of self and
family; subjection to military discipline and law; and inability to resign, strike,
or negotiate over working conditions. All this is above and beyond the dangers
inherent in military maneuvers and actual combat operations.
It is also significant that a paternalistic remuneration system has evolved
in the military corresponding to the calling mode: compensation received in
noncash form (e.g., food, housing, uniforms), subsidized consumer facilities
on the base, payments to service members partly determined by family status,
and a large proportion of compensation received as deferred pay in the form of
retirement benefits.
•• A profession is legitimated in terms of specialized expertise, i.e., a skill level
formally accredited after long, intensive, academic training. The prerogatives
of the professional center around conditions supportive of skill levels, control
of the work situation, and determination of ethical practices by one’s peers.
Compensation is often in the form of fee for service and a function of individual
expertise. There is also the presumption that the practice of one’s specialty will
be a lifetime career. A profession typically advances its group interests through
the form of professional associations.
The term “military professional” is one widely used by service members
to describe themselves. It is also a characterization used by leading students
of the military to describe career officers.2 Certainly, the multitiered military
education system for officers—as typified by the service academies, command
schools, and the war colleges—is patterned after the professional model.3
Moreover, the various service associations closely resemble their counterparts
in civilian professional associations. Yet, the concept of profession applied to
the military does have its limitations. Military compensation is a function of
rank, seniority, and need—not, strictly speaking, professional expertise. (The
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exception to this occurs, interestingly enough, when the military organization
takes into account—via the mechanism of off-scale compensation—certain
professionals whose skills are intrinsically nonmilitary, the notable example
being medical doctors.) There is also the reality that few officers can make the
military their entire career (unlike civilian professionals, whose endeavors are
lifetime careers). Moreover, inasmuch as the term “military professional” in its
normal usage refers to career commissioned officers, does this imply that others
in military service are somehow “non-professionals” or, worse, “amateurs”?
To complicate matters further, many of the forces eroding the institutional
format of the calling are affecting the professional model as well—within and
outside the military.
•• An occupation is legitimated in terms of the marketplace, i.e., prevailing
monetary rewards for equivalent competencies. In a modern industrial society,
employees usually enjoy some voice in the determination of appropriate salary
and work conditions. Such rights are counterbalanced by responsibilities to meet
contractual obligations. The occupational model implies that priority inheres in
self-interest rather than in the task itself or in the employing organization. A
common form of interest articulation in industrial—and, increasingly, governmental—occupations is the trade union.
Traditionally, the military has sought to avoid the organizational outcomes
of the occupational model. This is in the face of repeated recommendations
of official commissions that the armed services adopt a salary system which
would incorporate all basic pay, allowances, and tax benefits into one cash
payment, and which would eliminate compensation differences between
married and single personnel, thus conforming to the “equal-pay-for-equalwork” principle of civilian occupations. Such a salary system would set up
an employer-employee relationship quite at variance with military tradition.
Nevertheless, even in the conventional military system, there has been some
accommodation to occupational imperatives. Special supplements have long
been found necessary to recruit and retain highly skilled enlisted personnel.
The above models of calling, profession, and occupation are, of course,
as much caricatures as they are descriptions of reality. In the case of the military, moreover, the reality is complicated in that the armed forces have elements
of all three models. There are also important differences between the various
services, but the heuristic value of the typology is valid. It allows for a conceptual understanding of the overarching and clearly dominant trends occurring
within the contemporary all-volunteer military—the decline of the calling, the
limits of professionalism, and the ascendancy of the occupational model.
Although antecedents predated the appearance of the all-volunteer force
in early 1973, it was the end of the draft which served as the major thrust to
move the military toward the occupational model. In contrast to the all-volunteer
force, the selective service system was premised on the notion of citizenship
obligation—with concomitant low salaries for lower enlisted personnel—and
the ideal of a broadly representative enlisted force (though this ideal was not
always realized in practice). In point of fact, it was the occupational model
which clearly underpinned the philosophical rationale of the 1970 report of
the President’s Commission on an All-Volunteer Force (“Gates Commission
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Report”).4 Instead of a military system anchored in the normative values of
a calling—captured in words like “Duty,” “Honor,” “Country”—the Gates
Commission explicitly argued that primary reliance in recruiting an armed
force should be on monetary inducements guided by marketplace standards.
It is important to stress that although the Army was the only service
to rely directly on large numbers of draftees for its manpower needs, all the
services were beneficiaries of the selective service system. It is estimated that
close to half of all voluntary accessions into the military in the peacetime
years between the wars in Korea and Vietnam were draft-motivated. The draft
was also the major impetus for recruitment into the ROTC and the reserve/
guard units.
While the termination of the selective service system is the most dramatic
change in the contemporary military system, other indicators of the trend toward
the occupational model can also be noted: (1) the significant pay increases given
the armed forces since 1971 in an effort to make military compensation competitive with civilian rates; (2) the previously mentioned recommendations of
governmental panels to establish a military salary system, thus making civilianmilitary remuneration “comparable”; (3) proposals to eliminate or reduce a host
of military benefits, e.g., subsidies for commissaries and exchanges, health care
for dependents, and the pension system; (4) the separation of work and residence
locales accompanying the growing proportion of single enlisted men living off
base; (5) the incipient resistance of many military wives at officer and noncom
levels to taking part in customary social functions; and (6) the unacceptably
high rate of attrition and desertion among enlisted personnel in the post-Vietnam
military. The sum of these and related changes confirming the ascendancy of
the occupational model in the social organization of the emergent all-volunteer
military.

Consequences of the Occupational Model
A shift in the rationale of the military toward the occupational model
implies organizational consequences in the structure and, perhaps, the function
of the armed forces. The discussion which follows is not to be construed as
advocacy of such organizational consequences nor even of their inevitability.
But it does argue that if the industrialization of the military continues, then
certain outcomes are to be anticipated. If any of these outcomes are deemed
undesirable, attention should be directed at their causes—the transformation of
the military into an occupation—and not simply at the outcomes themselves.
Two changes in particular are presently apparent in military social
organization: (1) the growing likelihood of unionization in the armed services,
and (2) the increasing reliance on contract civilians to perform military tasks.
Even though seemingly unrelated, both such organizational changes derive
from the ascendant occupational model. Each deserves a little elaboration.

Trade Unionism
That trade unionism might take place within the armed forces of the
United States was barely more than a remote thought just a few years ago. But
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today there are signs that such an eventuality could come to pass. The growing
labor militancy of previously quiescent public employees at municipal, state,
and federal levels may be a precursor of like activity within the military system.
Even the “professional” diplomatic corps has come to be represented by a union
in all but name—the American Foreign Service Association. Military trade
unions have been long-standing in many Western European countries, including several NATO members.5 But it was the advent of the all-volunteer force
which made unionization of the American armed forces a live possibility. The
reliance on monetary incentives to recruit an armed force is quite consistent
with the notion of trade unionism.
In 1975, the National Maritime Union (NMU), a union affiliated with
the AFL-CIO, reported that it was considering organizing sailors in the US
Navy. The independent Association of Civilian Technicians (ACT) has been
for some time a union for civilians who work full-time for the reserve and
guard (almost all of whom are also members of the units employing them). The
most substantial initiatives, by far, of the various possibilities for military trade
unionism are those of the American Federation of Government Employees
(AFGE), affiliated with the AFL-CIO. In its 1976 annual convention, the AFGE
amended its constitution to extend membership eligibility to military personnel
serving on active duty. The bulk of the AFGE’s 325,000 membership already
consists of civilian employees working on military installations. By early 1977,
though still stopping short of a concerted organizing drive, the AFGE appeared
to be preparing to accept members of the armed forces into its own ranks.
It is important to emphasize that groups like the AFGE, NMU, and the
ACT are staunchly patriotic, conservative in their approach to social change,
and professedly bread-and-butter unions. There is no connection between these
unions and the radicalized and self-styled servicemen’s unions which appeared
in the late years of the Vietnam War. But there is a potentially disquieting
implication if such established unions succeed in organizing the military: the
politicization of the armed services arising from the usually close working relationship of the AFL-CIO with the Democratic party at national and local levels.
Legal obstacles do exist in the way of military unions. Current Defense
Department directives allow service members to join unions, but forbid commanders from negotiating with unions. Additionally, legislation was introduced
in the 94th Congress to prohibit unionization of the armed forces (including
reserve/guard as well as active-duty personnel). Congress took no action on
the measure in that session, but similar bills are expected to be introduced
subsequently. Even if a law prohibiting military unions were to be passed by
Congress and signed by the Chief Executive, its constitutionality would certainly be tested in the courts. Military commanders already are permitted to
negotiate with unionized civilian employees on military installations. Since
1975, moreover, military commanders have been delegated explicit authority
to sign local labor agreements with civilian personnel. Also indicative of the
changing scenes are those cases in which groups of Navy enlisted technicians
whose special enlistment bonuses were canceled have demonstrated and filed
suit for either payment of their bonuses or immediate discharges.
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It goes without saying that military unions are anathema to almost
all senior officers and many civilians. Yet, throughout the ranks of military
personnel, there is a widespread view—and a quite accurate one at that—that
the institutional qualities of military life are being undermined. Currently, this
dissatisfaction centers around the perceived erosion of military benefits and
the job insecurities resulting from periodic reductions in force. Not so well
understood is that the institutional features of the military system may have
been traded off for the relatively good salaries enjoyed by military personnel in
the all-volunteer force. The potential for unionization is great precisely because
military social organization has moved in the direction of the occupational
model, while much of its membership harkens to the social supports of the older
institutional format. It is also possible that a unionized military would not be
accorded the favor it presently enjoys from the public (which is prone to view
the military as the embodiment of a calling).6 Indeed, it is likely that a military
union might be looked upon in more crass terms than would be anticipated,
owing to the burgeoning reaction against public employee unions in general.

Civilian Technicians
Where trends toward military unionization are organizational developments which could be incorporated—albeit with some strain—into the structure
of the armed forces, another consequence of the ascendant occupational model
departs entirely from formal military social organization. This is the use of
civilians to perform tasks which by any conventional measure would be seen
as military in content. The private armies of the Central Intelligence Agency
have long been an object of concern within the regular military command. but
what is anomalous in the emerging order is that, rather than assigning its own
military personnel, the US government increasingly gives contracts directly
to civilian firms—with salary levels much higher than comparable military
rates—to perform difficult military tasks. In other words, the very structure of
the military system no longer encompasses the full range of military functions.
It is hard to overstate the degree to which the operational side of the
military system is now reliant on civilian technicians. The large warships of
the US Navy are combat ineffective without the technical skills of the contract
civilians—the so-called “tech reps”—who permanently serve aboard those
ships. Major Army ordnance centers, including those in the combat theater,
require the skills of contract civilians to perform necessary maintenance and
assembly. Missile warning systems in Greenland are in effect civilian-manned
military installations run by firms who are responsible to the US Air Force. In
Southeast Asia and Saudi Arabia, private companies such as Air America and
Vinnel Corporation were given US government contracts to recruit civilians
who carried out military activities. Bell Helicopter and Grumman established
a quasi-military base in Isfahan, Iran, staffed by former American military
personnel, who trained Iranian pilots.7 During the collapse of South Vietnam,
chartered civilian aircraft were used to rescue American nationals under virtual
combat conditions. The American monitoring force in the Sinai was contracted
out to private industry, with the government retaining only policy control.
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External political considerations certainly impinge upon the decisions
to use civilian contracts for military tasks. But if task efficiency is the issue, a
more nagging implication also suggests itself: military personnel cannot or will
not perform arduous, long-term duty with the efficacy of contract civilians. If
this were to become the norm, beliefs conducive to organizational integrity and
societal respect—the whole notion of military legitimacy—become untenable.
The trend toward the employment of contract civilians to carry out military
tasks could be the culmination of the industrialization of the military purpose.
Developmental analysis applied to military social organization reveals
the impetus and probable outcomes of present trends in the military. The
hypothesis of the ascendant occupational model in the military system alerts
one to and makes sense out of organizational changes in the social structure of the military trade unionism. Concurrently, functions hitherto the
province of armed forces personnel will increasingly be performed through
civilian contracts.
To describe observable trends in military organization is not to mean
they are inevitable. If there is concern with current developments—the possibility of trade unionism, excessive reliance on contract civilians, service
morale, and the rest—then attention should be focused on the root cause—the
ascendancy of the occupational model—and not just on the overt symptoms. Of
concern should be how to maintain and strengthen the institutional qualities of
service life, how to adapt and reinvigorate the calling aspects in a modern and
complex military system. Developmental analysis offers an understanding of
the core social dynamics affecting the emergent military. Most important, such
understanding can serve to direct organizational change toward desirable ends.

Counteraction—And Beyond . . . ?
Although I have tried to be dispassionate in my analysis, I believe
the evidence is persuasive that current trends are moving the armed forces of
the United States toward norms and structures of an occupation. I would be
remiss, then, not to specify policy proposals which could counteract the ascendant occupational model. Such proposals might include: (1) a “plural military”
which would heighten the distinction within the armed service between the
more civilianized support components and the more military operational units;8
(2) trading off future pay raises for maintenance of noncash benefits; (3) shifting the role of the senior noncommissioned officer away from emphasis on unit
administration and toward more concern with the guidance of lower-ranking
enlisted personnel; (4) an internal-educational program accenting the broader
purpose and nonmonetary values of military service; (5) a recruitment policy
allowing short enlistments—perhaps two years—tied to post-service educational benefits, and geared toward combat arms and relatively nontechnical
assignments; and (6) service innovations in group representation procedures
other than that of the standard trade union. Each of the above proposals, separately or in some combination, would probably counteract in part the present
transformation of the military into an occupation.
To phrase the issue of the all-volunteer military solely in terms of
factors internal to the military organization, however, is to beg the larger
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question. Ultimately, the organizational direction of the emergent military
is connected with more general societal values of citizen participation and
obligation. Even though there is renewed talk of reinstituting conscription in
the wake of the recruitment and retention inadequacies of the all-volunteer
force, this possibility is viewed as unlikely in the current political climate. But,
more importantly, a return to the draft might well result in troop morale and
discipline problems exceeding what the military system could accommodate.
The central question remains: is there a way in which military service
can attract a large and representative cross section of American youth without
direct compulsion? I believe there is. Now is the time to consider a voluntary
national service program—in which military service is one of several options—
which would be a prerequisite for future federal employment.
For purposes of discussion, a two-year national service program aimed
at youth—male and female—is proposed. Such service would be expected to
take place after high school, or during or after college. National service would
be compensated for at levels comparable to that formerly given draftees. It
would be directed toward tasks which intrinsically cannot be filled through
sheer monetary incentives; for example, caring for the aged, infirm, and mentally feeble; performing conservation work; and serving in the combat arms of
the armed forces. In turn, only those who had completed such national service
would be eligible for later government employment at the federal level.
In terms of military manpower needs, this would mean assignment to
the ground combat arms and manual tasks in other services; it could also be oriented toward overseas assignment. Because the terms of such service would be
unambiguous, there would be no presumption of acquiring civilian transferable
skills, thus alleviating a major source of enlisted discontent in the all-volunteer
force. Such a manpower program would also have the merit of channeling
middle-class youth into relatively short assignments in the very military occupational specialities where such enlistments are most practical. Almost surely,
despite shorter tours than current enlistments, the effective length of military
service would not be markedly different form present, because increasing the
proportion of high school graduates would reduce the existing high attrition
rate among first-term servicemen.
At the same time, provision could be made for long-term personnel
who would be geared toward technical positions requiring extended training. It
would be expected that a combination of equal opportunity practices within the
military and the reality of the civilian marketplace would result in increasing the
representation of minorities in such long-term military positions.
Certainly such a national service plan would cause a fundamental readjustment of hiring priorities in the governmental sector. A modest precedent of
sorts has been the preferential treatment accorded veterans in the federal civil
service examination. Much discussion is needed on the manner in which the
implementation and details of such a program could be worked out. But the
core of the proposal is irreducible—some linkage between national service and
future government employment.
A voluntary national service program linked to future federal employment eligibility has many positive implications. It would avoid the “stick” of
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compulsion, but still appeal to a large constituency because of the “carrot”
of possible employment in the governmental sector. It would meet pressing
national needs in both the civilian and military spheres. It would be philosophically defensible by connecting future employment by the taxpayer to prior
commitment to national service. It would make public service an essential part
of growing up in America. Most important, it would clarify the military’s role
by emphasizing the larger calling of national service.
Taken together with the policy proposals enumerated earlier, this
national service program might well supply that factor thus far so sadly lacking
in properly completing the cycle with which this paper has been concerned:
obligation, calling, profession, or occupation.9
Notes
1. Heinz Eulau, “H. D. Lasswell’s Developmental Analysis,” Western Political Quarterly, 2
(June 1958), 229-42.
2. Morris Janowitz, The Professional Solider (New York: Free Press, 1960); Samuel P.
Huntington, The Soldier and the State (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1957).
3. Lawerance J. Korb, ed., The System for Educating Military Officers in the U.S. (Pittsburgh:
International Studies Association, 1976).
4. U.S. President’s Commission on an All-Voluneteer Force, Report (Washington: US
Government Printing Office, 1970).
5. An overview of the precedents and potentialities of military unionization is Ezra S. Krendel
and Bernard Samoff, Unionizing the Armed Forces (Philadelphia: University Pennsylvania Press,
1977).
6. A concise statement on the attitudes of the American public toward the military is John D.
Blair and Jerald G. Bachman, “The Public View of the Military,” in Nancy L. Goldman and David
R. Segal, eds., The Social Psychology of Military Service (Beverly Hills: Sage, 1976), pp. 215-36.
7. U.S. Congress, Senate, Staff Report to the Subcommittee on Foreign Assistance of the
Committee on Foreign Relations, U.S. Military Sales to Iran, 94th Cong., 2d Sess., 1976.
8. The original argument that the military was being segmented into a civilianized technical
component and a traditional combat element is found in Charles C. Moskos, Jr., “The Emergent
Military,” Pacific Sociological Review, 16 (April 1973), 255-79. Extensions of the “plural military”
thesis are Zeb B. Bradford, Jr., and Frederic J. Brown, The United States Army in Transition (Beverly
Hills: Sage, 1973), pp. 189-202; William L. Hauser, America’s Army in Crisis (Baltimore: Johns
Hopkins University Press, 1973), pp. 207-18; and David R. Segal, et al., “Convergence, Isomorphism,
and Interdependence at the Civil-Military Interface,” Journal of Political and Military Sociology, 2
(Fall 1974), pp. 157-71.
9. The author wishes to express his grateful acknowledgement of the support received from
the US Army Research Institute for the Behavioral and Social Sciences during the preparation of this
article. Sole responsibility for all findings and interpretation rests, of course, with him.

Winter 2010-11

31

